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USNMR SHAPE

USDOCOSOUTH

USLOSACLANT

USCINCEUR

USMISSION GENEVA

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 3618

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: BELGIAN PROPOSAL FOR THE SCOPE AND METHOD OF
REDUCTIONS

FOLLOWING IS AN INFORMAL TRANSLATION OF THE BODY (ANNEXEX EXCLUDED)
OF THE FOLLOWING IS BELGIAN PAPER CIRCULATED TO SYG AND
PERMREPS JULY 20 AND FORMALLY INTRODUCED BY DE STAERCKE
DURING JULY 25 NAC.

BEGIN TEXT:

1. THE DEVELOPMENT OF ALLIED SUBSTANTIVE POSITIONS FOR THE MBFR
NEGOTIATIONS CONSISTS ESSENTIALLY OF DETERMINING A FREAMEWORK
OF OPTIONS WHICH DOES NOT PRETEND TO REPRESENT THE FINAL SOLUTION
BUT WHICH REFLECTS WHAT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE ALLIES WITHOUT
BEING, A PRIORI, NON-NEGOTIABLE. IT IS A MATTER OF LAYING A
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FIRM BASE WITHOUT ASPIRING TO COVER THE ENTIRE GROUND AT ONCE,
OF DETERMINING WHAT WE WANT AND WHAT WE HOPE FOR--IT BEING
WELL UNDERSTOOD THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL IMPOSE UPON US ITS
INEVITABLE PROCESS OF GIVE AND TAKE.

2. THE FOLLOWING CONSIDERATIONS HAVE BEEN CONCEIVED IN THIS SPIRIT. THEY ARE ADDRESSED TO THE "OPTIONS" FOR THE FORTHCOMING MBFR NEGOTIATIONS PARTICULARLY WITH REGARD TO THE EXTENT OF THE REDUCTION OF GROUND FORCES AND THE METHOD FOR REDUCING THEM.

3. AMONG THE OPTIONS PROPOSED IN THE U.S. DELEGATIONS'S DOCUMENT OF APRIL 30TH, 1973, THE THIRD ONE, ENTITLED "MIXED PACKAGE", IS INTENDED TO COMPLEMENT ONE OF THE OTHER TWO OPTIONS BY BEING COMBINED WITH OR INTEGRATED IN IT. THUS THIS OPTION SHOULD LOGICALLY BE STUDIED LATER AS FUNCTION OF THE CHOICE WHICH WILL HAVE BEEN MADE BETWEEN THE TWO BASIC OPTIONS.

4. THE TWO BASIC OPTIONS PROPOSED IN THE U.S. DOCUMENT CITED ABOVE EACH CORRESPOND TO ONLY A PART OF THE OBJECTIVES BEING PURSUED BY THE MAJORITY OF THE ALLIED COUNTRIES (1). THE SECOND OPTION EFFECTIVELY ONLY CONCERNS THE U.S. AND SOVIET FORCES, EXCLUDING- OVEN IN THE LONG TERM--THE OTHER FOREIGN AND INDIGENOUS FORCES. ON ITS SIDE, THE FIRST OPTION ENTAILS REDUCTIONS OF NON-U.S. FORCES ON THE WESTERN SIDE PROPORTIONALLY AS HIGH AS THE REDUCTIONS IN U.S. FORCES.

5. A JUDICIOUS COMBINATION OF THESE TWO OPTIONS SHOULD PERMIT ADDING UP THE ADVANTAGES OF EACH AND REABSORBING THEIR RESPECTIVE DISADVANTAGES.

6. THE FOLLOWING FORMULA, CALLED "OPTION IV" FOR SIMPLICITY, ENDEAVORS TO RESPOND TO THESE CONSERNS:

A. WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE NEGOTIATION TACTICS INCLUDING THE OPENING POSITION, THE FINAL OBJECTIVE WOULD CONSIST IN AGREEING ON OVERALL CEILINGS FOR STRENGTHS, ON THE ONE HAND FOR ALL NATO GROUND FORCES LOCATED IN THE WESTERN PART OF THE MBFR ZONE AND ON THE OTHER HAND, FOR ALL THE WARSAW PACT'S GROUND FORCES LOCATED IN THE EASTERN PART OF THIS ZONE, U.S. AND SOVIET FORCES, HOWEVER, NOT BEING ABLE TO EXCEED THE LEVELS THEY ATTAIN AFTER THE FOLLOWING REDUCTIONS.

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B. FOR NATO, THIS OVERALL CEILING WOULD BE REACHED, IN ACCORDANCE WITH MINISTERIAL DIRECTIVES, THROUGH A 10 PERCENT MAXIMUM REDUCTION OF THE GROUND FORCES NOW PRESENT IN THE MBFR ZONE. ON THEIR SIDE, THE WARSAW PACT'S GROUND FORCES LOCATED IN THIS ZONE WOULD BE REDUCED IN THE REQUIRED PROPORTION (APPROXIMATELY 13 PERCENT) SO THAT THE TOTAL BALANCE SHOULD BE EQUAL TO THE OVERALL CEILING REACHED BY NATO ("COMMON CEILING").

C. THE TERM "REDUCTION" MUST BE UNDERSTOOD HERE AS MEANING THE DISAPPEARANCE FROM THE MBFR ZONE: THE "REDUCED" FORCES BELINGING TO COUNTRIES OUTSIDE THE MBFR ZONE WOULD BE REPATRIATED ("WITHDRAWALS"); WHILE THE "REDUCED" FORCES BELONGING TO COUNTRIES INSIDE THE MBFR ZONE WOULD BE DEACTIVATED AND PLACED IN A RESERVE

STATUS. AS FOR NATO, THE ACTUAL FORCES TO BE REDUCED ARE FREELY CHOSEN ("THIN-OUT"), WHILE FOR THE WARSAW PACT, THE FORCES WOULD BE REDUCED BY MAJOR UNITS.

D. ON EITHER SIDE, THE REDUCTIONS WOULD BE EFFECTED IN TWO DISTINCT STAGES, SUFFICIENTLY FAR APART IN TERMS OF TIME (PLUS OR MINUS 3 YEARS):

I. THE FIRST STAGE, WHICH COULD CONSIST OF SEVERAL PHASES, WOULD PROVIDE FOR A RELATIVELY HIGH REDUCTION, EQUIVALENT FOR EXAMPLE TO 17 PERCENT OF THE U.S. AND SOVIET FORCES (THE SAME PROPORTION FOR EACH OF THEM WOULD ENTAIL REDUCTIONS AT LEAST TWICE AS LARGE IN THE SOVIET FORCES AS IN THE U.S. FORCES GIVEN THE DISPARITY OF THE RESPECTIVE FORCE LEVELS TO WHICH THIS EQUAL PROPORTION WOULD BE APPLIED.

II. DURING THE SECOND STAGE, THE TOTALITY OF THE NATO FORCES OTHER THAN U.S. FORCES WOULD BE REDUCED IN THE PROPORTION NECESSARY SO THAT, ACCOUNT BEING TAKEN OF THE REDUCTIONS IN U.S. FORCES EFFECTED DURING THE FIRST STAGE, THE TOTAL BALANCE REPRESENTS APPROXIMATELY 90 PERCENT OF THE ORIGINAL NATO FORCE LEVEL IN THE MBFR ZONE. (IN CONFORMITY WITH THE PREVIOUS EXAMPLE, IF THE U.S. FORCES HAD BEEN REDUCED BY 17 PERCENT DURING THE FIRST STAGE, THE REDUCTION IN THE TOTALITY OF NATO FORCES, OTHER THAN U.S. FORCES, TO BE EFFECTED DURING THE SECOND STAGE WOULD THEN RISE TO 7 PERCENT). ON ITS PART, THE TOTALITY OF THE NON-SOVIET FORCES OF THE
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WARSAW PACT WOULD BE REDUCED IN THE PROPORTION REQUIRED FOR REACHING THE DESIRED "COMMON CEILING", ACCOUNT BEING TAKEN OF THE REDUCTIONS PREVIOUSLY MADE IN THE SOVIET FORCES (IN THE EXAMPLE CITED, THIS PROPORTION WOULD RISE TO OVER 9 PERCENT).

E. THE TWO ALLIANCES COULD, EACH ON ITS OWN SIDE, DECIDE FREELY ON THE DISTRIBUTION AMONG THE NATIONAL FORCES INVOLVED OF THE WEIGHT OF THE OVERALL REDUCTIONS REQUIRED DURING THE SECOND STAGE. EACH INDIVIDUAL NATIONAL FORCE, "FOREIGN" OR "INDIGENOUS", NEED NOT, NECESSARILY, UNDERGO A REDUCTION.

F. SUBSEQUENT TO THE SEOND PHASE, THE "COMMON CEILINGS" WOULD HAVE TO BE RESPECTED OVERALL BY BOTH SIDES, WITHOUT ANY OTHER "SUB-CEILING" EXCEPT THOSE CONCERNING RESPECTIVELY THE U.S. AND SOVIET FORCES INSIDE THE AFORESAID OVERALL CEILING.

7. THE TABLES IN ANNEXES A AND B SHOW THE RESULTS OPTION IV WOULD HAVE IF THE PROPORTIONS IN THE EXAMPLE CITED ABOVE WERE ADOPTED. THE TABLES COMPARE THESE TO THE RESULTS THE TWO BASIC U.S. OPTIONS WOULD ENTAIL. ANNEX A USES THE BASIC DATA CONTAINED IN THE U.S. DOCUMENT OF 30 APRIL, 1973, WHILE ANNEX B USES THE MBFR WORKING GROUP'S BASIC DATA. (2)

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A. COMPARED TO THE FIRST U.S. BASIC OPTION, OPTION IV ENTAILS TOTAL REDUCTIONS THAT ARE PERCEPTABLY EQUAL, BUT ON THE WESTERN SIDE THESE REDUCTIONS ARE PROPERLY GREATER FOR THE U.S. FORCES THAN FOR THE OTHER ALLIED FORCES.

B. IN CONTRAST TO THE SECOND U.S. BASIC OPTION, OPTION IV CONTAINS IN ADDITION FORCE REDUCTIONS OTHER THAN U.S. OR SOVIET ONES, BUT WITHOUT THEREBY DIMINISHING THE SIZE OF THE U.S. AND SOVIET RECUTIONS.

8. HOWEVER, IT IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO COMPARE THE OPTIONS AS ACCEPABLE OBJECTIVES--I.E. AS THEY ARE CONCEIVED PRIOR TO STARTING THE NEGOTIATIONS. IT IS STILL MORE IMPORTANT TO COMPARE WHAT WILL PROBABLY BE LEFT OF THEM AFTER THE EROSION THEY WILL NOT FAIL TO UNDERGO DURING NEGOTIATIONS. NOW, THIS DEGRADATION OF THE POSITIONS HAS EVERY CHANCE OF BEING EXERCISED IN THE SPIRIT SUGGESTED BY THE SUBSTANCE ITSELF OF EACH PARTICULAR
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OPTION, SO THAT IT IS MORE OR LESS FORESEEABLE. MOREOVER, ONE IS NOT UNAWARE OF THE BROAD OUTLINES OF THE OTHER SIDE'S POSITION--EVEN THE POSSIBILITY OF A REJECTION OF THE SO-CALLED ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS (THE ASYMMETRY BEGIN JUDGED, IF NOT ON

THE ABSOLUTE FIGURES OF THE REDUCTIONS, AT LEAST ON THEIR PROPORTIONS IN RELATION TO THE PRE-EXISTING QUANTITIES).

9. SO THERE IS EVERY REASON TO FEAR THAT IT WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE TO OBTAIN THE DESIRED PARITY BETWEEN NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT. FAILING THIS, THE FIRST U.S. OPTION HAS EVERY CHANCE, ALL THINGS CONSIDERED, OF ARRIVING AT A FORMULA PROVIDING FOR 10 PERCENT REDUCTION OF ALL FORCES INDISCRIMINATELY (EVEN IF THE WITHDRAWALS OF FOREIGN FORCES ARE EFFECTED IN A SEPARATE FIRST PHASE). ANNEX C SHOWS, ACCORDING TO THE TWO SETS OF BASIC DATA AVAILABLE, WHAT SUCH AGREEMENTS WOULD MEAN: TOO MUCH REDUCTION IN NON-U.S. FORCES FOR NATO AND TOO LITTLE REDUCTION IN SOVIET FORCES FOR THE WARSAW PACT.

10. THE SECOND U.S. OPTION RUNS THE RISK OF EXTENDING RIGHT AWAY THE REDUCTION RATE BY ONE SIXTH TO ALL FOREIGN FORCES IF THE PRECAUTION HAS NOT BEEN TAKEN TO AGREE FROM THE START TO A LOWER RATE FOR SUBSEQUENT REDUCTIONS OF INDIGENOUS FORCES (WHICH WOULD, HOWEVER, BE INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE SPIRIT OF THIS OPTION), THERE WOULD BE THE RISK OF ENDING UP ALSO WITH A REDUCTION OF ONE SIXTH FOR THESE FORCES. ANNEX D SHOWS THE RESULTS TO WHICH THE SECOND U.S. OPTION RISKS LEADING IN THE END: THE OVERALL MAXIMUM PLUS OR MINUS 10 PERCENT REDUCTION OF NATO FORCES, PRESCRIBED BY THE MINISTERIAL DIRECTIVES, WOULD BE EXCEEDED.

11. AS FOR OPTION IV, FAILING ALSO TO ACHIEVE PARITY BETWEEN NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT OWING TO ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS IN NON-U.S. AND NON-SOVIET FORCES, IT WOULD QUITE NATURALLY END IN STIPULATING REDUCTIONS PROPORTIONALLY EQUAL ON BOTH SIDES, I.E.,:

A. IN AN INITIAL PHASE, A 17 PERCENT REDUCTION OF U.S. AND SOVIET FORCES (AS IN THE BASIC OPTION); AND

B. IN A SECOND PHASE, A 7 PERCENT OVERALL REDUCTION OF NATO'S NON-U.S. FORCES AND OF THE WARSAW PACT'S NON-SOVIET FORCES.

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12. JUST LIKE THE FALL-BACK POSITION IN THE FIRST U.S. OPTION, THE FALL-BACK POSITION IN OPTION IV ENTAILS, IN TOTAL AND IN SPITE OF "SYMMETRY", MORE REDUCTIONS IN THE EAST THAN IN THE WEST, GIVEN THE DISPARITY OF THE LEVELS AT THE STARTING POINT. (SEE ANNEX E.) BUT BUT COMPARISON, IF ONLY FROM THE NUMERICAL POINT OF VIEW OF THE RESPECTIVE FALL-BACK POSITIONS, OPTION IV:

I. ENTAILS 13,980 MORE REDUCTIONS IN THE EAST AND 1,215 LESS REDUCTIONS IN THE WEST, HENCE A NET FAVORABLE BALANCE OF 15,195;

II. LEADS TO 27,300 MORE SOVIET REDUCTIONS FOR 9,646 LESS U.S. REDUCTIONS, HENCE A NET FAVORABLE BALANCE OF 17,654;

III. CAUSES, IN THE WEST, 10,861 LESS REDUCTIONS IN NON-U.S. FORCES; (THESE DIFFERENCES, SURPRISING AT FIRST SIGHT, ARE ESSENTIALLY DUE TO THE FACT THAT, IN OPTION IV, HIGHER REDUCTION PROPORTIONS ARE APPLIED TO THE PREJUDICE OF A CATEGORY OF FORCES WHICH, ON THE EASTERN SIDE, REPRESENT A LARGER PART IN THE TOTALITY OF FORCES THAN IS THE CASE ON THE WESTERN SIDE.)

13. IN RELATION TO THE FALL-BACK POSITION IN THE SECOND U.S. OPTION, THE FALL-BACK POSITION IN OPTION IV:

I. ENTAILS 5,580 LESS REDUCTION IN THE U.S. FORCES AND 1,300 MORE REDUCTIONS IN THE SOVIET FORCES, HENCE A NET FAVORABLE BALANCE OF 6,880;

II. LEADS TO 53,244 LESS REDUCTIONS IN THE WEST FOR 41,621 LESS REDUCTIONS IN THE EAST, HENCE A NET FAVORABLE BALANCE OF 11,623;

III. CAUSES 47,664 LESS REDUCTIONS IN NATO'S NON-U.S. FORCES FOR 42,921 LESS REDUCTIONS IN THE WARSAW PACT'S NON-SOVIET FORCES, HENCE A NET FAVORABLE BALANCE OF 4,743.

14. THE DETAIL OF THE NUMERICAL COMPARISONS SUMMARIZED IN PARAGRAPHS 12 AND 13 ABOVE FOR THE TWO SETS OF BASIC DATA AVAILABLE IS TAKEN UP IN ANNEX F.

15. ANNEX G CONTAINS A BRIEF SYNOPSIS OF OPTION IV, BASED ON THE FIGURES CITED IN THE EXAMPLES IN THIS WORKING PAPER.

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FOOTNOTES

(1) DOCUMENT C-M/73/50(3RD REVISE) AND ITS CORRIGENDUM: "SECRET DIRECTIVES FOR MBFR NEGOTIATIONS", APPROVED BY THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, COPENHAGEN, WITHOUT, HOWEVER, A CHOICE HAVING BEEN MADE FROM AMONG THE BRACKETED FORMULAE.

(2) MILSTAM(MFBR)-10-73 AND AC/276-WP(73)4

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